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BOOK REVIEWS
THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH. By Louis Heren. New
York: Harper & Row. 1968. Pp. 366. $7-95.
When faced with an analysis of the American political system
written by a European, I tend to approach it with an air of hesitancy.
It has been my experience that many contemporary non-American
writers often do not really understand the intricacies of our political
system, and, therefore, cannot explain the total operation of our
politics objectively. There always seems to be the tendency to compare
the American system with their native system, and, thereupon, to
offer an explanation based upon reflection rather than examination.
Louis Heren's The American Commonwealth comes very close
to following the pattern described above, but there are just enough
astute observations of the American scene to place this book on the
borderline. This book could not be used as a text in American Government, even though there are some excellent chapters such as the
ones concerning the Secretary of State and the National Security
Council, because it lacks a certain intuitive understanding that most
American writers and analysts seem to display. It would, however,
be extremely useful for students of American Government to read
The American Commonwealth for an interesting account of their
system and themselves from an outsider's point of view.
Louis Heren is the Times (London) correspondent in Washington,
D.C. He is a devoted British subject, and like most educated Britons,
quite knowledgeable in the areas of government and history in the
United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. This awareness of British
politics provides a prejudicial basis for understanding other systems
and at the same time creates an analytic barrier to things not British.
There is also some question in my own mind concerning whether
Heren is more the 19th century than 2oth century man. Recently,
on a television news program, he made two 19th century observations
about 2oth century problems. When questioned on his feelings about
the racial crisis in the U.S., Heren observed that he did not consider
it critical enough to destroy the system under present conditions.
He used India as an example of a country which has experienced
considerable racial and religious difficulties and has managed to
maintain stability. There is little doubt that the Indian National
Government has been relatively stable but socially India has been
quite unstable. It is at this point that Heren's comparison of the
U.S. and India under similar conditions breaks down.
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The second 19th century observation related to the threat of
Communist China. Heren did not understand the fear that China
invoked in other nations. He considered China to be an adolescent
power hemmed in by mountains and therefore, not a serious threat
to other countries. One could not ask for a better example of 19th
century perception than that.
It is not unusual, therefore, that Heren starts and finishes his
book with a controversial analysis and comparison of the American
President and what he calls the "presidential system" with the concept
of an "English medieval monarchy." It is on this point that he introduces most of his British history and indicates his inability to
relate to the complexities and uniqueness of American federal politics.
In belaboring the awesome responsibilities and power of the President,
Heren also seems unable to understand the very simple universal
concepts of power.
It is his contention that the U.S. was founded upon republican
and democratic principles of representative government but that these
principles have eroded, particularly at the national level. As a result,
power has been shifted almost completely to the President and he
alone reigns supreme. Once he has received the mandate of the people,
he assumes the role of the most powerful individual in the world and
there seems to be little in way of controlling him while he is in office.
He is a "King-President" utilizing the Divine Right of Kings in
modern times. He is beholden to the people but he also speaks for
them. He ultimately controls their lives domestically and internationally. The King's men are various advisors, friends and Cabinet
Secretaries, all of whom are appointed and are part of his entourage
when he assumes office. They remain only so long as they are agreeable to the President. Once they are viewed as disagreeable, they are
released and others are appointed. All offices under his jurisdiction
are extensions of his authority.
The "many hats of the President" illustration is utilized (Chief
Legislator, Chief Diplomat, Commander-in-Chief, etc.) to strengthen
this argument. Virtually, nothing is left out. The Vice President is
the crown prince and the Secret Service agents are beefeaters with
crew cuts and button-down collars.
All of this and more emanates from the President's inherent and
broadly interpreted constitutional powers. The analogy is fair to the
respect that both feudal kings and modern presidents have been
endowed with vast power. The similarity really ends here because the
ways in which they attain power, use it and lose it are quite different. This feudal monarch analogy really is a very poor one.
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How many feudal kings would have permitted their judiciary
to assume the lead in various important renovations of the political
system such as civil rights and reapportionment, or would have
abdicated because a growing militant minority refused to accept a
position on foreign policy and were able to sway many others to
their way of thought? How many of the feudal monarchs would have
permitted a legislature which did not truly represent the majority
of opinion nationally or even on occasion, in their constituencies, to
stifle their programs?
There are many more illustrations, both formal and informal, to
counter Heren's analogy. He does not understand the latent responsibilities of the President, his advisors and cabinet to American democratic government. Nor does he seem to understand or recognize the
interplay between Congress, the President, and the Court, and for
that matter, the differences of opinion in the lower echelons of the
administrative bureaucracy.
Heren would have to combine the concepts of democracy as presented by Plato with the results of contemporary empirical investigation into political behavior patterns to understand the current
American approach to democracy.
If one can get through the first chapter, "The Presidency," without being too greatly offended, he will find the rest of the book rather
informative and enjoyable. Heren's chapters on the Supreme Court
and Congress are standard and well done. His discussion of Congress
with reference to their roles as delegates rather than representatives
is particularly thought provoking to anyone who happens to be considering a reorganization of that branch. He also covers the other
areas of parties, state and local government, and the people in a
routinely textual fashion adding a bit more history and personal
opinion than is usually seen in texts of this type.
Heren offers the reader something extra in Part II of his book.
This section covers the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Council. Usually, the subjects are given scant attention by writers of American Government texts. They are handled
very well and his ability as a reporter is more clearly evident here
than elsewhere.
The style, thoughts and analyses are British. The American Commonwealth is a historical essay on the American Political System.
Unlike Robert Dahl's Pluralistic Democracy in the United States
which technically falls into the same category, it is devoid of important empirical observations. Even though it appears to have been
written for the British public and contains a rather controversial
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description of presidential authority, The American Commonwealth
is a commentary on our political system worth reading.
DONALD

WHAT THE

GENERAL PRACTITIONER

M. BomoCK*

SHOULD

KNOW

ABOUT TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS. By Arthur
H. Seidel. Philadelphia. ALI-ABA Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education. 1967. Pp. 199. $4-75.

This book can prove very valuable, but the function which the
book will serve must be understood before the book has real significance.
The subject of trademarks and copyrights is one which has become
increasingly important to almost every lawyer, whether he be located
in a large metropolitan area or a small town, and whether he is primarily concerned with trial practice or business practice. Clients are
naturally involved with their own individual problems, but experience indicates that as any practice develops, client Jones who initially
appeared with a personal injury case, a tax problem, or a divorce
problem, is likely to thereafter appear with a business problem or
is likely to make a recommendation to someone else who has a business problem.
In many of such situations, it is common to find that the client
wants to organize a business and select a particular name, that the
client has been engaged in a particular business but has a new product
which he would like to distribute, or that the client has some advertising technique or program which he wants to use, or protect and
present nationally for widespread publication. Mr. Seidel's book,
What the General PractitionerShould Konw About Trademarks and
Copyrights purports, by its title, to supply the lawyer who does not
specialize in trademarks and copyrights with some guidelines. While
a careful review of the book indicates that it contains, in an organized
manner, almost all, if not all, the information which is essential to
handling at least the initial stages of trademark and copyright matters,
the presentation in the book seems likely to drive the general practitioner directly to the specialist when, during the initial stages, the
general practitioner is probably trying to secure more of a "feel"
for the problem than specific refinements which would either later
*Assistant Professor of Government and Law, Lafayette College.

346

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

be handled by the specialist, or considered after extensive study of
the matter by the general practitioner.
If the client is a young organization which is not well financed,
the general practitioner may recognize that it would be desirable to
secure the services of a specialist, but financial conditions preclude
this possibility. The general practitioner therefore finds himself in a
position where he has some basic questions such as: Is it a simple
job to at least make some check of prior registrations of the particular
trademark involved? Is it a relatively simple matter to secure some
basic rights under the copyright law without necessarily consulting
a specialist and proceeding with the immediate filing of a copyright
registration? Or, from the practical standpoint, should I do more
than find out from the Corporation Commission of the state in which
this company is to be organized whether the name which the company
has selected is available?
These basic questions can be easily answered if one first considers
some of the simpler and less refined trademark procedures or some
of the most basic requirements of the copyright statutes. Yet, Mr.
Seidel's book tends to approach the situation from the standpoint
of complexity rather than simplicity. The first sentence, for example,
reads as follows: "The American trademark system is complicated by
the fact that it comprises two separate systems, namely, the federal
trademark statutes and the trademark statutes of each of the states...
(p.').
There is no doubt that this statement is quite accurate. At the
same time, it leads the general practitioner to the conclusion that
every trademark problem is necessarily complicated, when in fact,
most trademark considerations can be rather easily handled merely
by making a comparatively inexpensive seach through the pertinent
records in the United States Patent Office. Similarly, from the copyright standpoint, use of the copyright notice on any published material is the essential prerequisite to copyright protection and this
simple notice, such as "© 1968 Jones, Inc." can be readliy applied
to any printed material.
To the client and to the general practitioner concerned with a
trademark, the important factors are whether the mark is in conflict
with another mark, and if not, whether the particular mark under
consideration can be protected. It makes little difference at the
outset if it is used on a particular product so that it is technically
a trademark, if it is used in association with a particular service so
that it is technically a service mark, if it names a particular organization so that it is technically a collective mark, or if it identifies a
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given stamp of approval and is technically a certification mark. Although a search through the Patent Office records admittedly is not
"all inclusive," it is used as a guide in a multitude of instances, and
certainly can be used as a means to determine that a particular mark
is definitely not available. In the writer's opinion, therefore, the
discussion in Mr. Seidel's book concerning the complexities of the
trademark law and the categories of marks is a matter which should
follow a rather simple initial explanation of the overall general situation. In this sense, Mr. Seidel's book is lacking in a practical approach.
The same seems true of the copyright discussions in the book.
Yet, if the book is to be used by the general practitioner as a
"short form" source book in the same sense that the general practitioner might use Corpus Juris, then the book is highly recommended
because it contains the information which would be significant for
this purpose.
SAMUEL

L.

DAVIDSON*

OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? Edited by
Stanley V. Anderson. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
1968. Pp. 192. $4.95.
This book attempts serious scrutiny of the desirability of the adoption of the Ombudsman idea in this country. It consists of five essays
by students1 of the institution and a reprint of a model statute drafted
by Professor Gellhorn of Columbia University Law School which
would serve to create the office. Each of the contributors appeared to
be committed to an affirmative response to the question whether
Ombudsmen would be a desirable addition to American government
so that the negative of the question is never seriously or professionally
examined. The editor, Mr. Stanley Anderson, in his essay states what
are presumably the most cogent arguments against the adoption of
the office in the United States and Professor Gwyn recites what are
alleged to be the undesirable consequences of the introduction of the
office, but their presentations clearly do not stem from conviction
and reinforce the lawyer's view that adversary exposition is the best
way to achieve full understanding of an issue in controversy.
This particular study failed to convince the writer that there was
any inherent desirability in the adoption of the notion. In fact, notwithstanding the perceptiveness of Professor Moore's analysis of
the case work of state legislators which would be grist for the Ombuds*Partner, Jacobi, Davidson and Jacobi; Washington, D.C.
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man, which in conjunction with Professor Gwyn's essay, give us a
good notion of what this office is all about, in my view the study
perpetuates the confusion which surrounds the institution and which
inheres in the debate concerning its adoption in this country.
I have adverted to the one-sidedness of the presentation. 2 What
is less excusable and is a pervasive failure of this work is the lack
of analysis of the nature of the office based upon its original purpose
and its development since that time. A more careful analysis would
have introduced a precision in the discussion which is lacking in this
book and indeed in much of the literature on the subject. In addition
to the lack of original analysis, we were disappointed that in this
kind of a study by political scientists about what is claimed to be a
significant political institution there could not be found reference to
any a priori support for the notion in the writings of political theorists.
We can only presume there is none; it of course is difficult to believe
that Sweden alone of the Western democracies was capable of creating an instrument of government as vital to the well-being of a
democratic society as this one is claimed to be and that it should have
remained undiscovered for 16o years.
We in America should not brook reproach for an alleged failure
to exploit to the full the tools available to government for the protection of the individual or become defensive and point to institutions
which have arisen or have been created to perform comparable
functions. Defensivenss is uncalled for and would stem from the same
lack of analysis of which those who would reproach us are guilty.
The superiority of the institution of the Ombudsman is non-existent:
it was never intended to accomplish what it is now most admired
for and even for that purpose can only be called inept; it is unthinkable that any political theorist would suggest the creation of this
kind of an institution to achieve the ends which it is purported to
accomplish.
'Stanley V. Anderson, Editor, Introduction; Donald C. Rowat, The Spread of

the Ombudsman Idea; William B. Gwyn, Transferring the Ombudsman; John E.
Moore, State Government and the Ombudsman; William H. Angus and Milton
Kaplan, The Ombudsman and Local Government; Stanley V. Anderson, Proposals

and Politics; Walter Gellhorn, Appendix: Annotated Model Ombudsman Statute.
2It is difficult to understand why none of the seriously adverse comments on
the institution found their way into this work. E.g., Jagerskiold, The Swedish
Ombudsman, lo9 U. PA. L. REv., 1071, 1o89 (g6i), where a Swedish professor
points out that the Ombudsman's power to reprimand officials without judicial
action is non-reviewable and so is capable of abuse; in effect, that some of the
practices he has developed are suggestive of blackmail. See also Gellhorn, The
Ombudsman in Denmark, 12 McGILL L.J. 1, 2 (1966), where the Ombudsman is
quoted as saying "the office has been oversold."
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The Ombudsman was created in the Swedish Constitution of 18o9
for the fundamental purpose of maintaining the integrity of the
Swedish governmental services. 3 Protection of the individual was not
an objective of its creation.4 If the Swedish language had the equivalent of the term "supervisor", and so labeled this institution for
what it is, i.e., an overseer of government services, the infatuation
for this office would not have reached the proportions which it has
now assumed in this country since it would have been clear that
there was nothing esoteric about its function or purpose.
Apparently in the period from its organization until recent years
the necessity for legislative oversight of the governmental ministries
diminished; we can only speculate that improved communications, the
creation of a class of professional administrators, an increase in the
level of education, etc., etc., resulted in a diminution of the activities
of the Ombudsman directed toward the fundamental objective of the
institution and a corresponding decline in the number of derelictions
of duty to cope with. Concurrently, one of the methods by which any
governmental investigatory or supervisory service achieves its purpose,
i.e., by means of information from the public about official wrongdoing, grew in importance. It may be that satisfaction of the informant
became something of an objective, and so complaints which were not
serious enough to call into play the prosecuting function of the
Ombudsman became occasions for writing to various ministries that
they had been, e.g., unnecessarily rude to some citizen or other.
Undeniably there is enormous appeal in the notion that if the
clerk in the motor vehicle bureau is offensive a citizen should be able
to obtain redress of some kind, and so what is veritably a by-product
of the institution, has become popularized in this country, as if it
were its very essence.
But note that what has been popularized is an inversion of the
function of a very ordinary and pedestrian institution. By reason of
this inversion, the institution is now ambivalent in function. It not
only supervises the administrative arm of government, it affords "redress" to the victims of the defects in the administrative machinery.
3The jurisdiction of the two Ombudsmen consists of supervising "the observance of the laws and statutes ....The Swedish Ombudsman, supra note 2.
'This is more clearly stated with respect to the Danish Ombudsman, Christensen, The Danish Ombudsman, 109 U. PA. L. Rxv. 11oo, i1o3 (1961). "The Ombudsman is by law the mandatory of Parliament and exercises his control over the
government services on behalf of that body."; See Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 3,
where it is noted that the objective of the office was "the establishment of increased guaranties for lawful conduct of the government's civil and military
administration."
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The redress, of course, is most pallid; unless the informant's purpose
is to correct a violation of law by a civil servant and call into play
the prosecuting function of the Ombudsman, the result of the complaint is that the offending or offensive administrator will be rebuked
by the Ombudsman.
This functional inversion 5 or ambivalence creates great difficulty
in maintaining fruitful discussion since the institution is praised in
respect to its performance of both functions even where the point at
issue, as in this book, is its incidental, or "redress" function. So its
proponents who purport to be advocating its adoption for the sake
of an oppressed citizenry point indiscriminately to institutions of
standing and even of renown which accomplish effectively one or the
other of the ambivalent functions of the Ombudsman but not both.
Professor Gwyn points to the French Conseil d'Etat as an institution
with "Ombudsmanlike features" but the Conseil is in fact a tribunal
of justice, an administrative court comparable to our own Court of
Claims. 6 It has no duality of function; it is unequivocally there to
afford redress to citizens aggrieved by administrative action.
The institution of the Ombudsman is then compared by another
contributor, Professor Moore, with the California Commission on
Judicial Qualifications. But there is no ambivalence in the function of
that Commission. It was created "to investigate and hold hearings
on complaints alleging misconduct, failure of performance, habitual
intemperance, or disability of judges; to encourage the resignation or
retirement of unfit judges, and-where necessary-to recommend that
an order of removal be issued by the State Supreme Court" 7 (p. 73).
It is perfectly clear that the Commission was designed to enforce
acceptable standards of judicial performance among the members of
the California bench. It has nothing to do with redress of grievances
except in the most indirect way. It is submitted that this institution
is precisely the equivalent of the Ombudsman in its original form.
To extol it as the ideal instrument of redress for persons aggrieved
by judicial behavior would be a misconception of the function.
Professor Rowat's chapter on the Spread of the Ombudsman Idea
consists of a series of indiscriminate references to any institution with
functions comparable to either of the Ombudsman functions.8
5"Indeed the Nineteenth Century JO (Ombudsman) scarcely qualifies as an
Ombudsman as described in this essay" (p. 62).
'Wyle, The Strength and Weakness of French Administrative Law, CANIB. L.J.
242 (1965).
7Professor Moore himself cites the fact that the Commission's orientation is
toward the improvement of the judiciary.
8
He refers, for example, to Vigilance Commissions formed in India to combat
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If I may suggest an analogy to illustrate the fallacy at the root of
all of the clamor for the Ombudsman, let us suppose that a forceful
and persuasive judge of the Court of Claims toured the speaking
circuits in the Scandinavian countries emphasizing the beneficial effect
on administrative action of Court of Claims decisions overruling errors
of the administrative agencies. Let us further suppose that many members of the Scandinavian bar were intrigued by this method of improving administrative procedure and were vociferously and effectively
in favor of the institution of a Court of Claims for the purpose of
improving administrativeprocedures! If that fanciful set of facts were
to materialize, we would have the obverse of what we are witnessing
here with respect to the Ombudsman.
One of the most inexplicable aspects of the enchantment with the
Ombudsman is the fact that he is powerless to right a wrong; he can
merely reprimand the erring civil servant. Unfortunately in this work,
the Ombudsman's lack of power, although frequently mentioned, is
inadequately emphasized and its significance never evaluated. There
is a tendency, I believe, to justify this relative impotence, by stressing
the improvement in public administration which should result from
the institution. 9 This, of course, brings us full circle: an institution
designed to supervise administration becomes popularized on the
basis of one of its incidental benefits and its adoption for that purpose
is justified on the ground that it will improve administrationl
Since it is exceedingly difficult in this environment to state a
case for a relatively powerless institution, the lack of power in the
Ombudsman is compensated for by frequent reference, at least in
Chapter 4, "Ombudsman in Local Government," to examples of socalled Ombudsmanlike action, many of which have absolutely nothing
in common with the concept of the Ombudsman. In fact some of the
instances advanced to illustrate the desirability of an Ombudsman in
local government are fatuous beyond belief. The author hails the
case where a citizen reports to the Nassau County equivalent of the
Swedish Ombudsman that a neighbor's driveway is being asphalted
corruption to the office of Inspector General of the United States Army and to
the Conseil d'Etat mentioned above. Even Prof. Kenneth Gulp Davis does not
maintain the distinction between the two functions above-described. In Davis,
Ombudsman in America, 1o9 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (ig6i), he writes "When a
bureaucrat irritates you or delays too long or requires too much red tape or
denies what you want you can quickly and easily get relief if you are entitled
to it by merely writing to the Ombudsman." Id. at 1057. He then discusses what
he calls "Ombudsman in America" and includes the Hoover Commission, a
Congressional Committee on Administrative Procedure and Practice and comparable Committees and Commissions devoted to the oversight function.
9E.g., Gwyn, at 41; Moore, at 98; Anderson, at 155.
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by a county truck, and the latter rushes to the scene to find that an
asphalt dealer had purchased a truck from the county but the county
insignia were never removed! If this happy ending for good government had not ensued, if this were a county truck, an official whose
power was limited to a written rebuke would not be the person I
would like to call. Other examples cited in this chapter make the
Ombudsman a guardian of the etiquette of judges to lawyers, an extremely able social worker, an object of complaints about governmental
indifference to a road menace, a protector against police brutality
and the instigator of improved tax lien legislation. The examples are
numerous but by and large trivial. 10 In fact triviality is clearly the
hallmark of all the numerous examples of the performance of the
Ombudsman function in other countries and it is submitted must be
the hallmark of any function whose work product is letters of reprimand. No really important goals are remitted to achievement by correspondence. If a trivial grievance is sufficiently widespread to amount
in the aggregate to a significant issue, it is fair to conclude that it
will not go unnoticed. If it is more than trivial, the possibility of a
more effective form of redress and a corresponding lack of a need for
the Ombudsman is enhanced. Professor Moore's chapter on State Government and the Ombudsman, a workmanlike and scholarly effort to
analyze the utility of the Ombudsman in terms of the "case work
load" of a pair of California state legislators, is the best indication
of the nature of the work the Ombudsman will handle and the most
persuasive statement of the triviality of the proposed work load of
the Ombudsman. His feeling that such "case work" could be better
handled by transferring it to an Ombudsman who would introduce
continuity and expertise seems to me to be a further step in the dehumanization of government and, assuming the legislators are adequately staffed, something of a vote of no confidence in representative
government. To whom should the citizen more properly look for
satisfaction for mistreatment than his elected representative?
If we disregard what I perceive to be the fundamental confusion
"The supporters of the Ombudsman feel that he should be a man of great
stature, a person comparable in standing to the judge of the highest court in
the state (Gellhorn's statute gives him a salary, allowances and benefits equivalent
to that of the chief judge of the highest court of the state). The incongruity of
having a distinguished member of the bar in charge of an office, writing letters
to local commissioners of motor vehicles to suggest that they speed up the
issuance of operators' licenses and otherwise to perform work ordinarily relegated
to state legislators and their administrative assistants is never given attention. It
is clear from every example cited in this book that the function is too trivial to
warrant the employment of a person of talent.
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which arises from the duality of the Ombudsman function is it possible to create an office whose avowed objective is the redress of
grievances of individuals suffering at the hands of inefficient and discourteous civil servants? This is what Professors Moore and Gwyn are
talking about and it is very similar to the Norwegian Ombudsman who
differs from those of Sweden, Finland and Denmark. He does not
have the power to prosecute breaches of duty by administrative officials
as they do and in Norway the office was created to "protect the interests of the individual against all the mistakes we know are bound
to occur within a large administration."' 1 His duty is to see that
"the public administration does not commit any injustice against
any citizen."'12 However, the rules for the conduct of his office require
the exhaustion of administrative remedies before he may act. This
is unquestionably a necessary rule if he is not to be swamped with
work but it is one which would completely frustrate the objectives
of proponents of the institution-in this country.
It is interesting that the Norwegian Ombudsman, whose function
is limited to what I call the by-product of its Swedish prototype,
appears to be a matter of indifference in its own country. Gellhorn
quotes both a Norwegian lawyer and an official of a Norwegian
3
Ministry of Justice as feeling that the Ombudsman was unnecessary.
I do not believe that we in this country can effectively employ the
Ombudsman notion because it is too inherently involved in trivialities. The maxim de minimis non curat lex is not a cry of indifference; it is an axiom of objective reality. When the cure is not worth
the candle, the only recourse is to suffer the disease. Many of the
evils which are of concern to those who would seek to provide an
instrument of redress are no more than the inconveniences of modern
life. Perhaps because the poor are most frequently the butt of the
vicious, or the inefficient civil servant, these failings assume unwarranted proportions. But unless miracles of administration could be
achieved and a complaint instantly registered to a person instantly
capable of rendering a judgment and delivering a rebuke, it is submitted that the objectives of the proponents of the Ombudsmen are too
hopelessly unrealistic to receive serious attention.
ROBERT H.

"Gellhorn, The Norwegian Ombudsman, 18

STAN.

L.

REv. 293, 295

HAGGERTY*

(1966).

2Id. at 296.
WId. at 321.

*Partner, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood; New York, N.Y.
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THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES. Edited
by Alfred Avins. Richmond: The Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government. 1967. Pp. 761. $4.50.

This documentary compilation, published by the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government and edited by Professor Alfred
Avins of Memphis State University Law School, purports to be a
collection of all relevant legislative history on the Reconstruction
amendments to the Federal Constitution. The work encompasses not
only debates concerning the amendments themselves, but also printed
congressional discussion of civil rights questions beginning in 1849
and extending to 1875. Not surprisingly, this editorial effort comprises
a rather massive tome consisting of 764 large pages of relatively small
print plus thirty-two pages of introduction.
The editor has arranged the debates in chronological rather than
topical form. He defends his organization on the ground that since
the congressional commentators seldom delivered their oratory on
single subjects, to edit speeches for a topical approach would result
"in an ensuing loss of continuity." A recommended reading list, a
reader's guide, a subject index, a table of cases and authorities cited
by the debaters, a cross-reference to cases and authorities, and indices
of congressional speakers supplement the debates themselves.
The reader is supposed to learn from these debates that the modern
meaning of the Reconstruction amendments differs from that intended
by the drafters. This difference is crucial, so the publisher and editor
contend, since in their opinion the Constitution is a static not an
organic document, and therefore its true meaning can only be discerned by determining the intent of the framers. Any judicial interpretation of provisions or amendments violative of this legislative intent
is at best poor law and at worst unconstitutional. What the Commission and Professor Avins hope to accomplish by their publication is
of course to undermine the authority of recent Supreme Court decisions and congressional legislation in the areas of civil and criminal
rights. Professor Avins has made this goal obvious in a series of
related law review articles based on the legislative history he has
compiled.' In these articles he castigates, among other things, efforts
of the Supreme Court to decree racial integration on the basis of the
fourteenth amendment. He has even gone so far as to argue that
because the Court in Brown v. Board of Education2 allegedly did not
1
E.g., Avins, Fourteenth Amendment Limitations on Banning Racial Discrimination: The Original lUnderstanding, 8 ARMZ. L. REv. 236 (1967).

2347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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adhere to the legislative intention of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment, its ruling in that case is not the law of the land.3
One can quarrel with several of the assumptions of the publishers
and editor. In the first place it is questionable whether the Constitution is an embodiment of immutable principles to be discovered
by simply uncovering legislative intention. Virginia's own Chief Justice
Marshall warned against such a narrow conception when he wrote
in McCulloch v. Maryland4 that "we must never forget, that it is a
constitution we are expounding." 5 Other famous jurists have echoed
this sentiment. Chief Justice Hughes, writing in Home Building &
Loan Association v. Blaisdell,( contended that the argument "that
what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means
today.., that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined
to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and
outlook of their time, would have placed upon them ... carries its
7
own refutation."
Secondly, it is not clear that the prevailing spirit of the debates
as compiled by Avins lends itself irrevocably to the propositions he
has so prodigiously advanced here and in other places. What emerges
from a reading of this record is a mixed and confused picture. It is
true that some of the debaters expressed narrow constructions of the
amendments' broad language. But it is also true that many opponents
of Reconstruction read the amendments far more flexibly and predicted many of the interpretations which would come with the Warren
Court. Likewise, many of the most ardent supporters of the amendments, whom Avins is fond of characterizing as "ultra-radicals," displayed a seemingly premeditated evasiveness regarding the implications of such ambiguities as "due process," and "equal protection of
the laws." They did not deny the amendments could have broad
meaning, nor did they assert such comprehensiveness. They simply
talked in lofty terms, perhaps in the hope that at some future time
an enlightened Court would utilize the vague language of the amendments to fashion protection for the various minority groups of.society,
whether they be racial or supposedly criminal. Furthermore, many
of the orators spoke so vaguely about the statutory language -they had
molded that no precise meaning is extractable from their comments.
3Avins, De Facto and De Jure School Segregation:Some Reflected Light on the
Fourteenth Amendment from the Civil Rights Act of x875, 38 Miss. L. REv. 179

(1967).

'17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)

6 (i8ig).
r1d. at 407 (emphasis added).
e29o U.S. 898 (1933).
VId. at 442-43.

356

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

Finally, it is debatable whether Avin's collection is definitive. He
appears to have included all of the relevant Congressional debates
from 1849 to 1875, even that material which runs counter to his point
of view. But is it possible to determine "legislative intent" in the
broader sense of the term by simply amassing Congressional debates?
Ofttimes congressmen are not particularly candid in their congressional
oratory. On some occasions they engage in "planned dialogue" in
order to misrepresent legislative intention. In some instances they
express their true feelings in extra-legislative sources. In short there
is no iron law of judicial interpretation which requires a judge to
examine only the printed records of a legislature to find legislative
intent, especially when the Constitution is concerned.
Despite these faults, Avins and the Commission have fashioned
an impressive collection which will be useful to lawyers, judges and
students of constitutional history. The compilation is complete as
far as it goes and is carefully annotated and indexed. Although it is
too lengthy and detailed for use in any but a very narrowly based
college course, it will serve well as a research tool.
ROBERT M.

IRELAND*

THE FIRST FREEDOM. By Bryce W. Rucker. Carbondale, Illinois:
Southern Illinois University Press. 1968. Pp. xvii, 322. $12.5o.

The second' The First Freedom presents a survey of the attrition
in public comprehension and debate of local and national issues
attributable to the demise of publishing and broadcasting as competitive industries. Author Bryce W. Rucker's theme is that the grasp of
chain ownerships, of monopoly and oligopoly, of merger and conglomeration conflicts with the end of news media-the objective dissemination of and naturally biased editorializing on the news. His
minor premise, developed in Chapter 13 by reference to a Supreme
Court of the United States' homily, is that the guaranty of a free
press "rest[s] on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public" (p. 188).2 His conclusion is that the chains and
networks have perverted the protection of the first amendment such
*Assistant Professor of History, University of Kentucky.
"Professor Rucker has adopted the title from a 1946 book by Morris Ernst,
an attorney. The first First limited its castigation to the press; the second updates
the first and broadens the impact areas to include the broadcasting media.
2
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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that it is most frequently invoked to still voices which cry for the
preservation of the competitions of ideas and which would have government intervene to that end.
The format of the presentation includes a capsule history of the
inception, the growing pains, the delinquency and degeneration of
the papers, news services and syndicates, AM and FM radio, UHF
and VHF television, community antenna and subscription television.
His exposures and excoriations depend upon statistics for their force.
Professor Rucker blends the spice of anecdotes, gossip and scandal
with his extensive documentation to procure readability.
The author's message regarding the press is that in the devolution
from competing dailies and divergent viewpoints to the single ownership of news media the public is the loser.
Newspaper publishing is big business. In 1910, 57.1 per cent of
daily newspaper towns were served by competing dailies but by 1957
the percentage was 4.13 (p. 8). In seven cities with more than 500,ooo
population no general circulation dailies compete (p. 8). Of the 94
American cities with more than loo,ooo population only 24 are served
by non-chain newspapers (p. 9). The widespread failure of newspapers
with healthy circulations are attributed to the perfidy of the competition- discounted rates for morning and afternoon papers or for multimedia advertising, exclusive contracts for advertising, circulation and
syndicate features.
The currency of the material of The First Freedom is reflected in
the treatment of joint operation agreements. The author's criticism of
these arrangements-conceived to preserve independent news and editorial departments at the expense of joint advertising and circulation
departments-is that they promote combined advertising rates which
discriminate against competing media and forestall the entry of rival
newspapers. 3 Predictably, joint operation which is defended as preserving divergent viewpoints via the sustenance of failing newspapers
is often a prelude to merger. (p. 15).
Against this background, Professor Rucker introduces United
States v. Citizen Publishing Company 4 a civil action by the Justice
Department against a Tucson publishing company. Judge Walsh found
the operating agreements entered into between two Tucson publishing companies were illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.5
sUnited States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz. 1968)
recites that combination rates for advertising in the jointly operated Tucson Star
and Citizen garnered the advertisers a rate 19% less than the sum of the costs of
placing separate advertisements.
'280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz. 1968).
515 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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Senator Hayden of Arizona and the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) have acted. The author states ANAP "in
the name of 'freedom of the press' has used its influence to have a
bill introduced in Congress which would block the Justice Department
and deprive it of its most recent gain" (p. 16). The Tucson suit was
filed January 4, 1965, Senator Hayden introduced S.1 3 120 on March
i6, 1967 and ANPA as of March 1,1968 had taken no official position
on the bill.
S.1 3 12, entitled the "Failing Newspaper Act", is ostensibly designed to provide an exemption from antitrust prosecution for joint
operating agreements "that may be necessary for the survival of one
of the newspapers involved."7 A "failing newspaper" is defined as
one which "appears unlikely to remain or become a financially sound
publication." s The exemption is retroactive and applies to pending
actions. 9 This evidence suggests individuals with vested interests, rather
than ANPA, have been the moving force behind S.1312. The First
Freedom lists 23 such joint operations as of May, 1967 (p. 253, n-37).
ANPA members were furnished a copy of S.13 12 in a booklet dated
June 15, 1967 which also contained an interview with Senator Hayden
and a favorable letter from Arthur B. Hanson, ANPA's general counsel
who in an individual capacity testified before the Senate Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee, July 12. Fourteen publishers haxe expressed
varying degrees of opposition to S.1312 in subcommittee testimony.'9
At the ANPA convention in April, 1968, J. Hart Clinton, publisher
of The San Mateo Times, and Harold Andersen, president of The
Omaha World-Herald, debated its merits." In the report of the
ANPA Federal Laws Committee approving S.1312 the philosophical
and pragmatic views of publishers opposed to S. 3 12 on the grounds
of weakening the first amendment and inviting stringent federal regulation of the newspaper industry were reported. 12 In sum, ANPA
membership has hardly been a united lobby on behalf of S.1 3 12.
The legal implications of the Tucson case are far-reaching. In
granting the Justice Department a summary judgment, the district
OS.1
3 12, goth Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
7
1d. § 2.
sId. § 3(6).
9

Id. § 5. The retroactive application of S.13 12 is designed to remove clouds
from previously consummated joint operating agreements. The Justice Department
is not blocked by time limitations in giving antitrust laws a "backward sweep"
by attacking such operations. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &
CO., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
"See ANPA Gen. Bull. Nos. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 (1967), No. 12 (1968).
"N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1968, at 21, col. 2.
2ANPA Gen. Bull. No. 2 (Jan. 9, 1968).
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court exposed every joint operating agreement in the country to nullity
and cast further doubts upon the future of the "failing business
doctrine," a standard which S.1312 is designed to rejuvenate and
relax for newspapers.
Standard (AM) radio in large measure has triumphed over network
monopoly; and while their fare is not always palatable, independent
stations have prospered. Predictably, however, few of the powerful
50,000 watt day and night stations are independent of chains, newspapers and special interest groups. Professor Rucker reports that
overcommercialization of the broadcast hour, the loudness of commercials generally and "white areas" are leading problems confronting the FCC. UHF television and FM radio have been nurtured with
the neglect generally reserved for illegitimate children. The networks
with unexpected help from the FCC virtually eliminated UHF as a
competitive threat during the 195o's, but since April 3o, 1964, when
Public Law 87-529 became effective and required all television sets
13
shipped in interstate commerce to have UHF reception capacity,
interest in establishing UHF stations has flourished.The FCC though
has not enforced a restriction upon the quantity of UHF stations
which may be held by networks and other chains.
Community Antenna Television (CATV) was developed in response to the demand for service in "white areas". Spurred by initial
successes, CATV has invaded urban areas plagued with man-made
mountains where its systems markedly improve reception. The FCC
assumed jurisdiction of most CATV systems in 1966 and set forth
guidelines as to duplication of local television programming. The
author reports CATV is considering program origination-a development which might force the networks to upgrade their programming.
Subscription television (STV) which presents perhaps the greatest
opportunity for an escape from the ennui and malaise of network
fare still lacks FCC authorization. Both CATV and STV, however,
are bucking powerful vested interests, the networks which are hedging their bets by investing in CATV and STV.
The author's "Blueprint for Action" encompasses tax reform to
make the sale of newspapers and broadcasting stations less attractive;
mandatory public auction of a failing newspaper; more aggressive
reaction by the Justice Department and the FCC and FTC to license
trafficking, monopoly, merger and newspaper murder; and meaningful
declaration of the outside ownership interests of publishing, network
and conglomerate chains. Professor Rucker does not explore the opti"Proiessor Rucker cites (p. 285, n.26) of the costs of P.L. 87-529 to the public
at $5oo million by 197o.
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mum role of the Justice Department and the regulatory agencies or
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. He does emphasize that in news
media unlike public utilities the premium is upon competition. The
treatment of STV and CATV while concise is especially stimulating.
The First Freedom, provocative (ANPA and the networks will certainly be provoked) and informative, will provide the lawyer and
laymen with interesting leisure reading. The antitrust specialist and
administrative agency practitioner will find the documentation frustrating because the precedents that are referred to often lack sufficient citation for access.
A. FRANcis ROBINSON, JR.*

*Associate, Mitchell, Petty, and Shetterly; New York, N.Y.

